Shopping for the best AI presentation maker? An AI presentation maker is software that uses machine learning to help you get more done — it keeps getting smarter as the underlying models improve. Pricing, accuracy, and the size of the model behind the tool are the three factors that most affect daily usefulness. Whether you are a beginner or a pro, the right AI presentation maker slots into your workflow and pays for itself fast. Below we compare features, pricing, and real output so you can choose with confidence.
Microscope image processing
Microscope image processing is a broad term that covers the use of digital image processing techniques to process, analyze and present images obtained from a microscope. Such processing is now commonplace in a number of diverse fields such as medicine, biological research, cancer research, drug testing, metallurgy, etc. A number of manufacturers of microscopes now specifically design in features that allow the microscopes to interface to an image processing system. == Image acquisition == Until the early 1990s, most image acquisition in video microscopy applications was typically done with an analog video camera, often simply closed circuit TV cameras. While this required the use of a frame grabber to digitize the images, video cameras provided images at full video frame rate (25-30 frames per second) allowing live video recording and processing. While the advent of solid state detectors yielded several advantages, the real-time video camera was actually superior in many respects. Today, acquisition is usually done using a CCD camera mounted in the optical path of the microscope. The camera may be full colour or monochrome. Very often, very high resolution cameras are employed to gain as much direct information as possible. Cryogenic cooling is also common, to minimise noise. Often digital cameras used for this application provide pixel intensity data to a resolution of 12-16 bits, much higher than is used in consumer imaging products. Ironically, in recent years, much effort has been put into acquiring data at video rates, or higher (25-30 frames per second or higher). What was once easy with off-the-shelf video cameras now requires special, high speed electronics to handle the vast digital data bandwidth. Higher speed acquisition allows dynamic processes to be observed in real time, or stored for later playback and analysis. Combined with the high image resolution, this approach can generate vast quantities of raw data, which can be a challenge to deal with, even with a modern computer system. While current CCD detectors allow very high image resolution, often this involves a trade-off because, for a given chip size, as the pixel count increases, the pixel size decreases. As the pixels get smaller, their well depth decreases, reducing the number of electrons that can be stored. In turn, this results in a poorer signal-to-noise ratio. For best results, one must select an appropriate sensor for a given application. Because microscope images have an intrinsic limiting resolution, it often makes little sense to use a noisy, high resolution detector for image acquisition. A more modest detector, with larger pixels, can often produce much higher quality images because of reduced noise. This is especially important in low-light applications such as fluorescence microscopy. Moreover, one must also consider the temporal resolution requirements of the application. A lower resolution detector will often have a significantly higher acquisition rate, permitting the observation of faster events. Conversely, if the observed object is motionless, one may wish to acquire images at the highest possible spatial resolution without regard to the time required to acquire a single image. == 2D image techniques == Image processing for microscopy application begins with fundamental techniques intended to most accurately reproduce the information contained in the microscopic sample. This might include adjusting the brightness and contrast of the image, averaging images to reduce image noise and correcting for illumination non-uniformities. Such processing involves only basic arithmetic operations between images (i.e. addition, subtraction, multiplication and division). The vast majority of processing done on microscope image is of this nature. Another class of common 2D operations called image convolution are often used to reduce or enhance image details. Such "blurring" and "sharpening" algorithms in most programs work by altering a pixel's value based on a weighted sum of that and the surrounding pixels (a more detailed description of kernel based convolution deserves an entry for itself) or by altering the frequency domain function of the image using Fourier Transform. Most image processing techniques are performed in the Frequency domain. Other basic two dimensional techniques include operations such as image rotation, warping, color balancing etc. At times, advanced techniques are employed with the goal of "undoing" the distortion of the optical path of the microscope, thus eliminating distortions and blurring caused by the instrumentation. This process is called deconvolution, and a variety of algorithms have been developed, some of great mathematical complexity. The end result is an image far sharper and clearer than could be obtained in the optical domain alone. This is typically a 3-dimensional operation, that analyzes a volumetric image (i.e. images taken at a variety of focal planes through the sample) and uses this data to reconstruct a more accurate 3-dimensional image. == 3D image techniques == Another common requirement is to take a series of images at a fixed position, but at different focal depths. Since most microscopic samples are essentially transparent, and the depth of field of the focused sample is exceptionally narrow, it is possible to capture images "through" a three-dimensional object using 2D equipment like confocal microscopes. Software is then able to reconstruct a 3D model of the original sample which may be manipulated appropriately. The processing turns a 2D instrument into a 3D instrument, which would not otherwise exist. In recent times this technique has led to a number of scientific discoveries in cell biology. == Analysis == Analysis of images will vary considerably according to application. Typical analysis includes determining where the edges of an object are, counting similar objects, calculating the area, perimeter length and other useful measurements of each object. A common approach is to create an image mask which only includes pixels that match certain criteria, then perform simpler scanning operations on the resulting mask. It is also possible to label objects and track their motion over a series of frames in a video sequence.
Hardware trojan
A hardware trojan (HT) is a malicious modification of the circuitry of an integrated circuit. A hardware trojan is completely characterized by its physical representation and its behavior. The payload of an HT is the entire activity that the Trojan executes when it is triggered. In general, trojans try to bypass or disable the security fence of a system: for example, leaking confidential information by radio emission. HTs also could disable, damage or destroy the entire chip or components of it. Hardware trojans may be introduced as hidden front-doors that are inserted while designing a computer chip, by using a pre-made application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) semiconductor intellectual property core (IP core) that have been purchased from a non-reputable source, or inserted internally by a rogue employee, either acting on their own, or on behalf of rogue special interest groups, or state sponsored spying and espionage. One paper published by IEEE in 2015 explains how a hardware design containing a trojan could leak a cryptographic key leaked over an antenna or network connection, provided that the correct "easter egg" trigger is applied to activate the data leak. In high security governmental IT departments, hardware trojans are a well known problem when buying hardware such as: a KVM switch, keyboards, mice, network cards, or other network equipment. This is especially the case when purchasing such equipment from non-reputable sources that could have placed hardware trojans to leak keyboard passwords, or provide remote unauthorized entry. == Background == In a diverse global economy, outsourcing of production tasks is a common way to lower a product's cost. Embedded hardware devices are not always produced by the firms that design and/or sell them, nor in the same country where they will be used. Outsourced manufacturing can raise doubt about the evidence for the integrity of the manufactured product (i.e., one's certainty that the end-product has no design modifications compared to its original design). Anyone with access to the manufacturing process could, in theory, introduce some change to the final product. For complex products, small changes with large effects can be difficult to detect. The threat of a serious, malicious, design alteration can be especially relevant to government agencies. Resolving doubt about hardware integrity is one way to reduce technology vulnerabilities in the military, finance, energy and political sectors of an economy. Since fabrication of integrated circuits in untrustworthy factories is common, advanced detection techniques have emerged to discover when an adversary has hidden additional components in, or otherwise sabotaged, the circuit's function. == Characterization of hardware trojans == An HT can be characterized by several methods such as by its physical representation, activation phase and its action phase. Alternative methods characterize the HT by trigger, payload and stealth. === Physical characteristics === One of this physical trojan characteristics is the type. The type of a trojan can be either functional or parametric. A trojan is functional if the adversary adds or deletes any transistors or gates to the original chip design. The other kind of trojan, the parametric trojan, modifies the original circuitry, e.g. thinning of wires, weakening of flip-flops or transistors, subjecting the chip to radiation, or using focused ion-beams (FIB) to reduce the reliability of a chip. The size of a trojan is its physical extension or the number of components it is made of. Because a trojan can consist of many components, the designer can distribute the parts of a malicious logic on the chip. The additional logic can occupy the chip wherever it is needed to modify, add, or remove a function. Malicious components can be scattered, called loose distribution, or consist of only few components, called tight distribution, so the area is small where the malicious logic occupies the layout of the chip. In some cases, high-effort adversaries in may regenerate the layout so that the placement of the components of the IC is altered. In rare cases the chip dimension is altered. These changes are structural alterations. === Activation characteristics === The typical trojan is condition-based: It is triggered by sensors, internal logic states, a particular input pattern or an internal counter value. Condition-based trojans are detectable with power traces to some degree when inactive. That is due to the leakage currents generated by the trigger or counter circuit activating the trojan. Hardware trojans can be triggered in different ways. A trojan can be internally activated, which means it monitors one or more signals inside the IC. The malicious circuitry could wait for a count down logic an attacker added to the chip, so that the trojan awakes after a specific time-span. The opposite is externally activated. There can be malicious logic inside a chip, that uses an antenna or other sensors the adversary can reach from outside the chip. For example, a trojan could be inside the control system of a cruising missile. The owner of the missile does not know, that the enemy will be able to switch off the rockets by radio. A trojan which is always-on can be a reduced wire. A chip that is modified in this way produces errors or fails every time the wire is used intensely. Always-on circuits are hard to detect with power trace. In this context combinational trojans and sequential trojans are distinguished. A combinational trojan monitors internal signals until a specific condition happens. A sequential trojan is also an internally activated condition-based circuit, but it monitors the internal signals and searches for sequences not for a specific state or condition like the combinational trojans do. ==== Cryptographic key extraction ==== Extraction of secret keys by means of a hardware trojan without detecting the trojan requires that the trojan uses a random signal or some cryptographic implementation itself. To avoid storing a cryptographic key in the trojan itself and reduction, a physical unclonable function can be used. Physical unclonable functions are small in size and can have an identical layout while the cryptographic properties are different. === Action characteristics === A HT could modify the chip's function or could change the chip's parametric properties (e.g. provokes a process delay). Confidential information can also be transmitted to the adversary (transmission of key information). === Peripheral device hardware trojans === A relatively new threat vector to networks and network endpoints is a HT appearing as a physical peripheral device that is designed to interact with the network endpoint using the approved peripheral device's communication protocol. For example, a USB keyboard that hides all malicious processing cycles from the target network endpoint to which it is attached by communicating with the target network endpoint using unintended USB channels. Once sensitive data is ex-filtrated from the target network endpoint to the HT, the HT can process the data and decide what to do with the data: store the data to memory for later physical retrieval of the HT or possibly ex-filtrate the data to the internet using wireless or using the compromised network endpoint as a pivot. == Potential of threat == A common trojan is passive most of the time-span an altered device is in use. If a trojan is activated the device functionality can be changed, the device can be destroyed or disabled, the device can leak confidential information or the HT may tear down the security and safety of the device. Trojans are stealthy, to avoid detection of the trojan the precondition for activation is a very rare event. Traditional testing techniques are not sufficient. A manufacturing fault happens at a random position while malicious changes are well placed to avoid detection. == Detection == === Physical inspection === First, the molding coat is cut to reveal the circuitry. Then, the engineer repeatedly scans the surface while grinding the layers of the chip. There are several operations to scan the circuitry. Typical visual inspection methods are: scanning optical microscopy (SOM), scanning electron microscopy (SEM), pico-second imaging circuit analysis (PICA), voltage contrast imaging (VCI), light induced voltage alteration (LIVA) or charge induced voltage alteration (CIVA). To compare the floor plan of the chip has to be compared with the image of the actual chip. This is still quite challenging to do. To detect Trojan hardware which include (crypto) keys which are different, an image diff can be taken to reveal the different structure on the chip. The only known hardware Trojan using unique crypto keys but having the same structure is. This property enhances the undetectability of the trojan. === Functional testing === This detection method stimulates the input ports of a chip and monitors the output
VibeOS
VibeOS is an operating system built from scratch entirely by generative artificial intelligence, using code produced through prompts to Claude (vibe coding). It is capable of running on QEMU and was successfully tested on a Raspberry Pi Zero. It has been released under the MIT license. == Features == === Core === Custom kernel with cooperative multitasking (preemptive backup) FAT32 filesystem with long filename support Memory allocator, process scheduler, interrupt handling GIC-400 (QEMU) and BCM2836/BCM2835 (Pi) interrupt controllers Configurable boot (splash screen, boot target) === GUI === Desktop environment with draggable windows Menu bar, dock, window minimize/maximize/close Mouse and keyboard input Modern macOS-inspired aesthetic === Networking === Full TCP/IP stack (Ethernet, ARP, IP, ICMP, UDP, TCP) DNS resolver HTTP client TLS 1.2 with HTTPS support === Apps === Web browser with HTML/CSS rendering Terminal emulator with readline-style shell Text editor (vim clone) with syntax highlighting File manager with drag-and-drop Music player (MP3/WAV) Calculator, system monitor VibeCode IDE Doom port === Development === TCC (Tiny C Compiler) - compile C programs directly on VibeOS MicroPython interpreter with full kernel API bindings 60+ userspace programs (coreutils, games, GUI apps) === Hardware === Runs on Raspberry Pi Zero 2W USB keyboard and mouse via DWC2 driver SD card via EMMC driver 1920×1080 framebuffer == Further projects == There are other independent projects under the VibeOS name, including an independent development by Ben, also developed using vibe coding, aimed at creating a Unix-like operating system for educational purposes. Another project is Vib-OS, an operating system also built using vibe coding, capable of booting on a Raspberry Pi. It offers a desktop environment with a customizable wallpaper, a file manager, and a web browser currently in an early stage of development, a functional Doom port, among other features that are not very polished given the state of development.
Browser sniffing
Browser sniffing (also known as User agent sniffing and browser detection) is a set of techniques used in websites and web applications in order to determine the web browser a visitor is using, and to serve browser-appropriate content to the visitor. It is also used to detect mobile browsers and send them mobile-optimized websites. This practice is sometimes used to circumvent incompatibilities between browsers due to misinterpretation of HTML, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), or the Document Object Model (DOM). While the World Wide Web Consortium maintains up-to-date central versions of some of the most important Web standards in the form of recommendations, in practice no software developer has designed a browser which adheres exactly to these standards; implementation of other standards and protocols, such as SVG and XMLHttpRequest, varies as well. As a result, different browsers display the same page differently, and so browser sniffing was developed to detect the web browser in order to help ensure consistent display of content. == Sniffer methods == === Client-side sniffing === Web pages can use programming languages such as JavaScript which are interpreted by the user agent, with results sent to the web server. For example: This code is run by the client computer, and the results are used by other code to make necessary adjustments on client-side. In this example, the client computer is asked to determine whether the browser can use a feature called ActiveX. Since this feature was proprietary to Microsoft, a positive result will indicate that the client may be running Microsoft's Internet Explorer. This is no longer a reliable indicator since Microsoft's open-source release of the ActiveX code, however, meaning that it can be used by any browser. === Standard Browser detection method === The web server communicates with the client using a communication protocol known as HTTP, or Hypertext Transfer Protocol, which specifies that the client send the server information about the browser being used to view the website in a User-Agent header. === Server-side sniffing === Extensive browser techniques enable persistent user tracking even if users try to stay anonymous. See device fingerprint for more details on browser fingerprinting. == Issues and standards == Many websites use browser sniffing to determine whether a visitor's browser is unable to use certain features (such as JavaScript, DHTML, ActiveX, or cascading style sheets), and display an error page if a certain browser is not used. However, it is virtually impossible to account for the tremendous variety of browsers available to users. Generally, a web designer using browser sniffing to determine what kind of page to present will test for the three or four most popular browsers, and provide content tailored to each of these. If a user is employing a user agent not tested for, there is no guarantee that a usable page will be served; thus, the user may be forced either to change browsers or to avoid the page. The World Wide Web Consortium, which sets standards for the construction of web pages, recommends that web sites be designed in accordance with its standards, and be arranged to "fail gracefully" when presented to a browser which cannot deal with a particular standard. Browser sniffing increases maintenance needed. Websites treating some browsers differently should provide an alternative version for other browsers. Use of user agent strings are error-prone because the developer must check for the appropriate part, such as "Gecko" instead of "Firefox". They must also ensure that future versions are supported. Furthermore, some browsers allow changing the user agent string, making the technique useless.
Pydio
Pydio Cells, previously known as just Pydio and formerly known as AjaXplorer, is an open-source file-sharing and synchronisation software that runs on the user's own server or in the cloud. == Presentation == The project was created by musician Charles Du Jeu (current CEO and CTO) in 2007 under the name AjaXplorer. The name was changed in 2013 and became Pydio (an acronym for Put Your Data in Orbit). In May 2018, Pydio switched from PHP to Go with the release of Pydio Cells. The PHP version reached end-of-life state on 31 December 2019. Pydio Cells runs on any server supporting a recent Go version. Windows/Linux/macOS on the Intel architecture are directly supported; a fully functional working ARM implementation is under active development. Pydio Cells has been developed from scratch using the Go programming language; release 4.0.0 introduced code refactoring to fully support the Go modular structure as well as grid computing. Nevertheless, the web-based interface of Cells is very similar to the one from Pydio 8 (in PHP), and it successfully replicates most of its features, while adding a few more. There is also a new synchronisation client (also written in Go). The PHP version has been phased out as the company's focus is moving to Pydio Cells, with community feedback on the new features. According to the company, the switch to the new environment was made "to overcome inherent PHP limitations and provide you with a future-proof and modern solution for collaborating on documents". From a technical point of view, Pydio differs from solutions such as Google Drive or Dropbox. Pydio is not based on a public cloud; instead, the software connects to the user's existing storage (such as SAN / Local FS, SAMBA / CIFS, (s)FTP, NFS, S3-compatible cloud storage, Azure Blob Storage, Google Cloud Storage) as well as to the existing user directories (LDAP / AD, OAuth2 / OIDC SSO, SAML / Azure ADFS SSO, RADIUS, Shibboleth...), which allows companies to keep their data inside their infrastructure, according to their data security policy and user rights management. The software is built in a modular perspective; up to Pydio 8, various plugins allowed administrators to implement extra features. On the server side, Pydio Cells is deployed as a collection of independent microservices communicating among themselves using gRPC and logging user actions via Activity Streams 2.0 (AS2). Pydio Cells microservices are built with the Go Micro framework (using an embedded NATS server). A standard installation will deploy all required services on the same physical server, but for the purposes of performance, reliability and high availability, these can now be spread across several different servers (even in geographically separate locations) according to the 12-factors architecture pattern. Pydio Cells is available either through a free and open-source community distribution (Pydio Cells Home), or a commercially-licensed enterprise distribution (in two variants, Pydio Cells Connect and Pydio Cells Enterprise), which add features not available in the community distribution as well as additional levels of support beyond the community forums. == Features == File sharing between different internal users and across other Pydio instances SSL/TLS Encryption WebDAV file server Creation of dedicated workspaces, for each line of business / project / client, with a dedicated user rights management for each workspace. File-sharing with external users (private links, public links, password protection, download limitation, etc.) Online viewing and editing of documents with Collabora Office (Pydio Cells Enterprise also offers OnlyOffice integration) Preview and editing of image files Integrated audio and video reader Activity stream ('timeline') for all actions taken by users Integrated chat platform Client applications are available for all major desktop and mobile platforms.
False answer supervision
False answer supervision (FAS) refers to VoIP fraud where the billed duration for the caller is more than the duration of the actual connection duration. The FAS is usually performed by VoIP wholesalers in their softswitches for randomly selected calls. Adding a small amount of extra billed seconds for many calls results in significant revenue for the VoIP wholesaler. == Implementation of FAS == The FAS fraud can be implemented in a softswitch in many different ways. These include: False billing of party A without calling a party B. Usually a fake ringback tone, loopback audio or voicemail message is played Start of billing before actual answer of party B Extra billing after disconnection of party B == Detection of FAS == The FAS can be detected and blocked in a softswitch. Common methods are: Manual verification of call detail records: listening to voice recordings Identification of FAS types and using algorithms to automatically detect the FAS RTP audio signal processing: detection of voice RTP audio signal processing: detection of silence RTP audio signal processing: detection of ringback tone